implementation has been integrated into a broader national reform and openness programme, it is hard to separate the consequences of accession from those of other reforms. Still, it is evident that some of the changes to the Chinese political economy have been either generated or hastened by the WTO and in this regard it is now possible to see the contours, if not the full extent, of the WTO's impact.
This current article explores one key aspect of the WTO's effect on reform and openness in Chin--the impact on domestic openness. Conceptually, 'domestic openness' covers a broad range of economic, social and political liberties and freedoms. For the purpose of this article, the concept primarily means openness to Chinese citizens as manifested by the removal or reduction of the Party-state's control of economic activity. It includes, in particular, decreasing state monopoly and bureaucratic intervention in market entry, exit and competition; improved legal regulation; and increasing transparency of trade-related rules and rule-making.
The article examines domestic openness at two levels, namely the central government's formal harmonization with WTO standards and the implementation of newly harmonized standards at the county level. This decision is based on two overlapping assumptions.
First, while WTO-consistent laws and regulations provide a necessary framework for openness, it is crucial to understand their actual implementation not only at the national level but also at the grass-root level--particularly the county since it is the most basic level of governmental authority in China. Second, openness is likely to develop more quickly in big cities than in rural areas, and that the longer term significance of any openness that fails to penetrate to the vast countryside will be greatly compromised. 4 In order to provide empirical data to inform this study, the article focuses on Dingzhou, a county-level city in central Hebei Province. Dingzhou has been selected primarily because since the 1930s social scientists have often considered it to be a fairly typical rural community in North China in terms of its demographic, social and economic conditions. 6 In addition, as Dingzhou is close to both national and provincial centres, it is likely to feel the WTO's impact sooner than remote regions, and yet it may be less subject to dramatic change like that found in the Special Economic Zones or highly developed coastal regions.
For these reasons, the changes here may be typical of changes in other counties in North
China.
An analysis of national WTO-related reforms coupled with evidence from interviews with entrepreneurs, shop-owners and officials in Dingzhou indicates that WTO accession has already made considerable difference to reform and openness in direct and indirect ways.
To date, the most consequential, direct result of WTO membership has been a new legal framework which encourages the uniform application of laws, transparency of rules and rule-making, non-discrimination, and openness. In addition, the direction and pace of reform are influenced as never before by external pressure, rather than predominantly driven by domestic logic, as China is obliged to implement its WTO obligations under international monitoring according to a fixed timetable. Perhaps even more far-reaching is the indirect impact of the WTO, which has, through a powerful 'WTO effect', generated additional pressure for reforms in areas not directly related to the WTO obligations.
6 For example, Dingzhou was one of counties selected in a comprehensive 'A social survey of 100 counties' by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in 1987. In recent years, a research group from CASS has been monitoring economic development in Dingzhou as part of a CASS project on the economic ecologies of selected counties.
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It is evident, however, that the reforms have focused on the formal harmonization of standards while implementation has a long way to go and is impeded by numerous obstacles, particularly at the local level. Moreover, the openness resulting from the reforms is predominantly economic openness, which has not posed a serious threat to the dominance of the CCP or translated into a demand for political liberalization and democracy. These findings cast doubt on the common assumption that external openness somehow leads to internal openness or that political openness inevitably ensues from economic openness.
A Better National Framework for Openness
Much of the fundamental importance of China's WTO membership, as Vice Minister of Finance Jin Liqun has noted, lies in its capacity to change the way the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) manages the economy and governs the state. 7 This is in part because the government, in order to gain WTO membership, had to make over 600 commitments, which entail a rule-based economy and a set of universal standards of trade and economic behaviour. 8 Since the commitments are in many ways incompatible with longstanding 6 Chinese economic and political policy principles, the Party-state must make ideological and structural adjustments before it can fulfil its commitments. While many of Chinese commitments and reforms have benefited domestic openness, the most noticeable impact on it has stemmed from the rule-of-law commitments and administrative approval reforms.
China's Rule-of Law Commitments
Under the Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China ('Protocol') and the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China ('Report'), which set the terms for accession to the WTO, China is required 1. To conform central government laws, as well as all administrative and sub-national government regulations, rules, and measures to obligations undertaken in the WTO Agreement and the Protocol (Para. 2(A)3), Protocol); 2. To apply and administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its national and local laws, regulations and other measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights or the control of foreign exchange. (Para. 2(A)2); 3. To establish a mechanism under which both individuals and enterprises can bring to the attention of the national government cases of non-uniform application of the trade and foreign investment regime (Para. 2(A)4), Protocol); 4. To enforce only published laws and regulations and to make them available before they are implemented (Para. 2(C)1), Protocol); 5. To provide a reasonable period for comment after its laws, regulations and other measures by persons who may be affected (Para. 2(C)2), Protocol); 7 6. To make transparent the administrative authorities in charge by publishing, in a designated official journal, a list of all organizations responsible for authorizing, approving or regulating service activities through grant of license or other approval, as well as the procedures and conditions for obtaining such licenses or approval (Para. 2(C)3), Protocol and Paras. 307 and 332, Report); and 7. To establish impartial and independent tribunals for the prompt review of administrative actions and review procedures including the opportunity for appeal, without penalty, by individuals or enterprises affected by any administrative action subject to review, and to provide contact points with respect to administrative actions (Paras. 2(D)1 and 2, Protocol).
These are clearly commitments to the core WTO principles of uniform application, transparency, reasonableness, non-discrimination, and judicial and administrative review of executive action. These principles not only demand openness to foreign businesspeople and enterprises but openness to Chinese nationals as well. The principle of uniform application, for instance, promotes domestic openness by insisting on legislative consistency and the uniform administration of all national and local legislation. A consequence of this is that departmental and local rules and policy measures inconsistent with higher-level legislation are no longer enforceable by law. Particularly pertinent to domestic openness is the removal of those elements that encourage local protectionism, restrict market entry and competition, or deny access to official information about economic policies and regulation.
The principle of transparency, as another example, requires that all trade-related laws, regulations, internal rules and other measures be made available to the public, and that the process of administrative decision-making be conducted on a basis that can be known.
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This helps reduce arbitrary uses and abuses or powers by officials as well as the confusion about legislation and administrative acts which ordinary Chinese citizens commonly experience. 9 Coupled with this is the principle of reasonableness, which enables individuals and businesses to provide feedback on, and therefore influence, the laws, regulations and internal rules which may affect their operations. 10 Also significant is China's obligation to establish an impartial system for review of decision-making, which makes it possible for citizens to prevent improper measures from being incorporated into legislation in the first place and to seek judicial review of unacceptable administrative actions. To be sure, as analysts customarily observe, such a system may not emerge in the absence of an independent judiciary, and China is therefore simply not able to fulfil this obligation. That may be the case, but as far as openness is concerned, judicial independence is less important than due process and fairness.
Theoretically at least, these are achievable in a system controlled by the Party-stateespecially in situations where its fundamental interests are not jeopardized as a result of impartial review. Moreover, there is no guarantee that a judicial system which is independent but corrupt will be more effective than one controlled by the CCP.
To a lesser extent, the principle of national treatment is also conducive to domestic openness, as China is obliged to 'progressively liberalize the availability and scope of the right to trade, so that, within three years after accession, all enterprises in China shall have Thus, a large number of economic sectors previously monopolized by SOEs must be opened to the private sector, and also private enterprises are entitled to the same preferential treatment accorded to the SOEs in terms of financing and pricing practices, taxation, market entry, resource distribution, and so on.
Formal Harmonization with WTO Standards
These commitments seem too ambitious to be met in the near future, given China's weak rule of law and institutional constraints. They certainly cannot be fulfilled unless the 
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The effects of this comprehensive legislative review and revision on domestic openness can only be surmised until researchers have carefully compared a significant number of the new and old laws, regulations and other measures. It is reasonable to believe, though, that at least most of the elements that obviously contravene WTO norms and impede openness have been eliminated. As one turns to the new legislation enacted in the last few years, there is even more reason for optimism about China's formal harmonization with the fundamental WTO principles, including those directly related to domestic openness.
The aforementioned review has already done much to ensure legal conformity to the principle of uniform application. In addition, China's current Legislation Law lays unprecedented emphasis on the consistency of the legal system and clearly defines the legislative and rule-making powers of the People's Congresses at all levels, the State Council, central government departments, and local governments (Articles 7, 56, 63, 71 and 75) . 18 It also gives these state organs specified powers to repeal legislation enacted by state organs under their supervision if the latter have overstepped their powers, or if their legislation is inconsistent with higher legislation (Articles 87 and 88). Furthermore, to ensure consistency, the Legislation Law stipulates that laws prevail over administrative regulations, local regulations and normative rules (Article 79), while local regulations are higher than the normative rules of the government at the same level or below (Article 80).
These requirements are spelt out in detail in two State Council documents released in 2001. 19 By comparison, China's efforts to make its regulatory regime transparent are less impressive. The most important achievement so far is the Legislation Law. This statute not only requires the publication of all Chinese legislation but also wide consultation with 'relevant departments, organizations and citizens' during the law-making process (Article 58), in contrast to previous legislation, which did not impose similar requirements. Since 2000, every new law has included a clause on publication. Not only that, the requirement is now extended well beyond economic regulation as required by the WTO to all government policies, administrative rules and normative documents unrelated to the WTO obligations. 20 At the same time, the principle of non-discrimination has also been embedded in Chinese law, most notably in the Administrative Approval Law, the Government Procurement Law 
Administrative Approval Reform
China's endeavour to establish a WTO-consistent legal system is accompanied by a national administrative approval reform, which covers a broad range of administrative actions. The importance of this reform lies in the fact that administrative approval is 'the act that an administrative approval organ, upon application by a natural person, legal person or any other organization, permits the latter to undertake a specific activity, to recognize the latter's qualification, to confirm the latter's specific civil relationship or capacity to exercise a specific civil right and to undertake a specific civil act'. 14 on the approval system and the discretion of the officials with the power to approve or not 25 The other three criteria include: whether an approval was suited to the socialist market economy, whether it facilitated changes in the function of the government, and whether it helped reduce corruption.
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The reform culminated in the promulgation of the Administrative Approval Law (AAL) on 27 August 2003 (to go into effect on 1 July 2004). This landmark law stipulates that no administrative approval should be established for the following matters:
• those issues which can be decided by natural persons, legal persons or other organizations which will not infringe upon the state, social or collective interests or the lawful freedom and rights of other natural persons (Article 13.1);
• those issues which can be resolved through market competition (Article 13.2);
• those issues which can be resolved through normal and fair intermediate organs or professional organizations (Article 13.3);
• those issues which can be resolved through setting standards and strengthening subsequent supervision (Article 13.4).
Of even greater importance to openness, the AAL specifies that the People's Congress and government bodies have the power to pass laws and rules which require citizens to obtain licenses or approval, determine the criteria upon which license or approval is to be granted or refused, dictate mandatory procedures for considering applications, and decide mandatory time limits within which applications must be processed. Furthermore, under this law affected citizens are entitled to an explanation as to the reasons their applications are not approved or their licenses or approvals are revoked, as well as the right to respond to and, in serious cases, institute an opportunity for a hearing.
Improvements and Remaining Problems
As a result of these reforms, the scope of administrative laws has been expanded considerably while the scrutiny of the legality of administrative decision has been 16 strengthened. There is also a clearer definition of, and better check on, the powers of the central and local governments in legislation and administration, and less need for administrative approval. At the same time, entrepreneurs and enterprises are now in a position to influence the outcome of legal or administrative reconsideration. All in all, government control of economic and social activity is obviously reduced, while better safeguards against abuses of power and infringements on citizens' rights by Party and government organs and officials have also been devised. While the same problems exist at all levels of government, the WTO-related reforms at the local level seem to be following a somewhat different trajectory. The same observation can be made about the extent of broader notions of openness. This makes it all the more necessary to move beyond China's WTO commitments and administrative reform and find out whether the new laws and regulations are actually enforced and to what extent implementation is boosting openness.
A More Open Dingzhou
Dingzhou is situated between Baoding and the Hebei provincial capital Shijiazhuang, and is less than three hours' drive from Beijing and Tianjin. The county has 507 villages in its 22 townships and the suburbs of the county town, and with a population of just over a million, it is more populous than two average Chinese counties combined. Its rural population (nongye renkou) represents just over 80% of the total in contrast to the national ratio 58.2 %. Still, Dingzhou has sizable industrial and service sectors, whose contribution to the GDP in 2004 respectively amounted to 39.3% and 27.9%. 28 In the same year, the county's GDP per capita reached 8,952RMB, exceeding the provincial average of 8,390RMB and approaching the national average of 9,057RMB. 29
As the WTO hype spread across China, the Dingzhou government took prompt action to implement the WTO commitments, although local officials seem to be more concerned county town, and notice-boards in government offices, in addition to government notices and newsletters.
Of these sources, the notice-boards in government offices are probably the most useful to the largest number of residents, as they can be found in government offices in the townships as well as the county town and provide easy access to a whole range of essential information about administrative actions, processes, fees and penalties. Next in the level of utility is the Dingzhou Daily, which is available at newsstands in the county town, although not in the townships or villages. The electronic notice-board publishes even more information with respect to public policy and administration, but few people come to the Square and it is not easy even for attentive passers-by to gather much information. The official website is no more effective partly because it is designed to attract investment and tourism from outside Dingzhou rather than to inform local residents about government actions that affect their lives, and partly because computers are still rare outside the county town.
The newsletters and internal, trade-related regulations, which are distributed exclusively to county government departments, the township governments, and district governments within the county town, are similarly difficult for ordinary citizens to access. While these various government bodies have the obligation to implement policies they have no obligation to disseminate the information, unless instructed to do otherwise. 39 This means that many policy changes are not directly communicated to elected village committees or ordinary citizens. It is up to the citizens themselves to find the information themselves.
The question remains as to how many people actually seek such detailed administrative Coupled with this prevalent lack of awareness is a common reluctance to seek clarification from officials who misuse their power, especially the grass-root officials carrying out routine checks on licenses, prices, hygiene, etc. at the local markets or isolated shops and factories. The story in the Dingzhou Daily of an unnamed owner of an audio-visual shop in a busy street in Dingzhou affords a good example of this problem. 40 According to the report, the owner had been charged an average of 5,000 RMB in penalties every year in the previous few years, in addition to the 4,800RMB in 'national tax', the same amount in 'local tax', 3,600RMB in 'industrial and commercial administrative fees', and a 'hygiene fee' of 360RMB. These items added up to 18,560RMB, in contrast to her annual income of 5,987RMB. But it was never explained to her how these charges were calculated, and she never asked for clarification out of fear of offending the officials and incurring worse treatment.
Her situation, the report stresses, is not an isolated example, but a rather common occurrence in Dingzhou. Nor is the owner of the shop the only local resident who is reluctant to seek clarification from the officials, or appeal to the relevant government departs, or take legal action. In fact, the overwhelming majority of the entrepreneurs, shop-owners and small business operators interviewed in this study indicated that they would rather 'negotiate' (shangliang) with the officials than confront them, and in the end they would 'pay up' if the officials did not demand an excessive amount. And generally, the officials do not demand such an excessive amount that would provoke strong reactions, and they routinely ask for less if they are treated to dinner or told that no receipts are needed so that they can personally 'pocket' the money.
This finding is not in the least surprising; the average Chinese would rather rely on informal means to achieve desired objectives than seek redress through administrative or legal channels, either because of fear of retribution, lack of confidence in government enquiry point to handle queries about administrative approvals and fees, it seems to have deliberately left out the contact details--which can be found in the related internal documents--when the abolished approvals were published in the Dingzhou Daily. This author's requests to view the list of retained approvals at three government offices involved in preparing the list were declined on the grounds that it was an internal document. Exactly the same answer was given by officials at the other end of the enquiry hotline (2313871/2331585). In this case it is clear that non-compliance and lack of transparency are quite deliberate and systemic, even though practical difficulties around information dissemination are also partly to blame.
In short, Dingzhou has taken significant steps towards transparency, non-discrimination and openness during its WTO implementation, but in many areas it has achieved little more than minimum compliance with the WTO commitments while lagging further behind in others. Much remains to be done before the WTO's potential impact becomes a reality.
The Nature and Spread of Openness
The discussion in the last two sections has demonstrated the WTO's most significant impact to date on reform and openness at central and local levels. 
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In a similar vein, globalization theorists hold that increased trans-national flows of goods, money, ideas and people push national economic and political systems towards the 'ideal' combination of a market economy and a liberal democratic political system. 49 Others speak of the end of the nation-state under the pressures and demands of a globalizing, capitalist economy. 50 If one combines these with expositions of 'the end of history', it is hard not to conclude that the Chinese Party-state is doomed.
There is certainly no lack of like-minded pundits amongst Chinese liberals and democracy advocates and US policy-makers. As an example, Liu Junning, one of China's leading liberal writers, has argued forcefully that the WTO and private ownership, together with the internet, will give rise to democratization in China. 51 The China policy of the US over the last two decades, as another example, has rested on the belief that the power and rule of the CCP will be weakened by external openness and international interdependence, and that a democratic China will emerge in the wake of rapid economic growth and deeper These suppositions may well be borne out in the long term. Whether they will be depends to a large degree on the nature and extent of openness and how it is spreading now, apart from prospects of revolutions or other dramatic events. As things in China stand, optimists are confronted with two major difficulties. First, the openness that has emerged in the implementation of WTO obligations is predominantly economic openness, which neither poses a significant threat to the Party-state nor easily translates into a demand for democracy. Second, the Dingzhou evidence shows that the WTO's impact on openness has been far less dramatic than most commentators predicted, that openness is not spreading far and wide enough to become a potent driving force for systemic change. This is not to say that Chinese entry into the WTO is politically insignificant. In fact, as has been pointed out, the 'WTO effect' has generated additional impetus for wider reforms, including political reforms, even in areas unrelated to WTO obligations. The 'WTO effect' has come about, first and foremost, because the Chinese government has deliberately used WTO membership as 'a shock therapy to destruct the old system and create a new one' and effectively swayed public opinion accordingly. 55 At the same time, foreign governments and businesspeople as well as pro-reform Chinese officials at all levels of government and academics have urged the Chinese government to undertake reforms which are not required by the WTO as if they were. Additionally, numerous unrelated administrative matters have been reviewed alongside related ones and dealt with in the same package.
Social and political openness has also flowed from China's rule-of-law commitments and the resultant legal framework to ensure administrative transparency, reasonableness and fairness. This legal system, together with reduction of administrative control of economic activity, has meant stronger constraints on the government's ability to intervene in economic life and to control human freedom. Conversely, ordinary citizens are more independent of state organs or officials. Moreover, the government has not just produced a comparatively WTO-consistent trade regulatory regime but is also reshaping its legal system in other sectors in accordance with the same principles. Further change in this direction is most likely given that a good legal system is often an all-or-nothing proposition. 56
55 Similarly, Holbig argues that 'WTO accession serves as an "external stick" for the leadership to assert itself against protectionist interests and to break deadlocks in the reform process.' See Heike Holbig, p. 171.
56 Donald C. Clarke, 'Statement Before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China'.
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In addition, some economic openness, such as the opening of state-monopolized sectors to private entrepreneurs, has clear political implications. As a consequence of growing involvement by the private sector, the Chinese 'socialist market economy' has become more capitalist, but that is precisely the sort of change that the CCP has been pursuing for over two decades albeit with the occasional temporary setback. There are also instances where economic openness is political openness at the same time. This is the case with numerous freedoms to engage in cultural or entertainment services without prior approval, such as the freedom for individuals and firms to establish live performance venues or film or television studios and to perform in public, and for professional and adult education colleges to decide their own curricula. While these freedoms may lead to an increase in cultural or education content unacceptable to the Party-state, at this stage that content is not likely to pose a serious threat to the CCP or translate into a demand for democracy not least because its impact will remain limited for some time.
In any case, it is hard to imagine that the CCP would allow these freedoms to escalate into a significant challenge to its rule without intervening. In fact, throughout the reform era, the CCP has continued to contain the political impact of openness while trying to reap the benefit of foreign trade, investment and technology. 57 Likewise, it has moved quickly to Therefore, there is no need for them to demand the implementation of the WTO principles--the equal treatment provisions least of all.
The only monitoring effort in Dingzhou has been an inspection by a delegation from the Baoding district government. However, in a session that lasted less than two hours all that the delegation did was listen to oral reports by local officials on the review of current regulations, internal rules and policy measures including the first batch of abolished approvals. 63 Without looking at the content of the large number of existing documents under review, it was impossible for the delegates to see if they comport with the WTO principles and national legislation, to say nothing of Dingzhou's overall implantation, which the oral reports did not cover. And yet, the delegation was ready to declare satisfaction with the WTO implementation there. This seems to suggest that the inspection was nothing but a perfunctory exercise that failed to press for more than minimum compliance. To make things worse, the Dingzhou government is under little pressure from local businesspeople and citizens to fully comply with the WTO obligations, as discussed earlier. It is little wonder, then, that Dingzhou's WTO implementation has lost momentum now even though it has some way to go before catching up with the national reforms.
Conclusion
In sum, Chinese accession to the WTO has already had a profound impact on domestic openness in China, although the impact is not as dramatic as many expected. Thus far greater openness has resulted most notably from a series of administrative reforms and a new trade regulatory regime, which have gone a long way towards uniform application, transparency, non-discrimination and impartial judiciary review, reduced ideological and administrative control over economic activities, and expanded the scope of rights and freedoms protected by law.
The WTO has generated this impact on the strength of a legally binding agreement, which has spelt out China's obligations to be fulfilled according to a fixed timetable. This is evidently an effective way of achieving global integration. Coupled with this is effective international pressure and monitoring. In addition, there is a large degree of congruence between the Chinese governments' reform agenda and most of the WTO fundamental principles. Without this, China probably would have been less keen to join the WTO and its WTO implementation would have met with far more difficulty than it has to date. The varied depth and scope of WTO implementation at principles at the central and local levels are attributable to differences in these factors. Simply put, the better the congruence between the WTO principles and the domestic logic and the stronger the pressure, the more successful the WTO implementation.
37
In all likelihood, China's economic and political reforms will continue in the years to come with or without intervention by the WTO and the international community at large, and consequently openness will expand further. Nevertheless, sustained efforts to hold the Chinese government to its WTO commitments will make a big difference to economic, social and political change and openness in China by pressing it to move beyond formal harmonization and minimum compliance towards full implementation of both the letter and spirit of the WTO commitments as well as effective enforcement of WTO-consistent laws, regulations and other measures in accordance with their content and purpose. If all levels of government are left to their own devices, further progress is less likely to take place, especially in areas faced with stiff challenges, including transparency, nondiscrimination and independent judiciary review.
Major external and internal sources of pressure include the WTO, member states, foreign businesspeople, higher-level governments, and Chinese citizens. Of these, internal pressure is obviously most indispensable to sociopolitical change. For example, if the Baoding district government had taken its monitoring effort more seriously and demanded better implementation of the WTO obligations in Dingzhou, the county government would most probably have obliged. To a lesser extent, pressure from Dingzhou citizens can also force the local officials to do a better job. Although they remain powerless quite often vis-à-vis the government, WTO membership has presented new opportunities for selfempowerment and administrative improvement. Unfortunately, higher-level authorities like the Baoding government have little incentive to demand more than minimum compliance from the lower-level governments, while deep-rooted attitudes amongst local residents are standing in the way of sociopolitical change. It might take years to foster a form of active citizenship that helps make government more transparent, reasonable and accountable.
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For these reasons alone, there is a clear need for external pressure. External pressure is potentially more effective for three he reasons. First, it is lawful and legitimate and therefore cannot be dismissed out of hand as interference in China's internal affairs, as is often the case with international criticism of human rights abuses in the country. Second, international monitors are unlikely to ignore or connive at non-compliance, in contrast to less interested inspectors from higher-level governments. And finally, international pressure can be applied to all levels of government in accordance with the Protocol. Given that the main stake of international players is concentrated in big cities, it is easy to understand why they have not paid much attention to WTO compliance at the local level.
It is harder to understand why foreign governments who are keen to encourage liberalization and political change in China, particularly the US, are slow to capitalize on the opportunities that the WTO has presented. Systematic implementation of WTO principles at all levels of governments is surely more effective for that purpose than occasional criticism of the Chinese government's human rights record.
